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Copyright © International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). All rights reserved. ( Source of the document: ICC Digital Library )
Introduction
Arbitration is used with ever increasing frequency to settle disputes concerning financial markets. Most stock market disputes in the United States are resolved through arbitration. In Europe, where the situation is less clear-cut, recourse to arbitration opens up promising prospects, at a time when financial markets are in the throes of considerable restructuring. The regrouping of the European markets, hailed by the merger of the Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels stock exchanges to form Euronext, has opened up new ways of contemplating the settlement of stock market disputes.
Such disputes generally arise in two distinct contexts. In the narrower of these spheres, they arise between exchange organizations and their members, the latter being authorized to transact on the market pursuant to a contractual agreement. Very often the disputes relate to observance of exchange rules by the member (so that they frequently include a disciplinary component) or to malfunctions of computer ordering systems. In the broader sphere, disputes occur between members, in their capacity as service providers, and their investor clients. The subject matter of these disputes, which are the more frequent of the two, includes advice given by the member to its client, performance of the latter's instructions and, in more general terms, the manner in which the member has managed the client's interests.
The handling of such disputes is frequently fraught with special problems, due to the highly sophisticated nature of the financial instruments, the complexity of the information technology employed and the highly specific nature of the rules and practices that govern the markets. In most countries there are no courts specializing in this type of dispute. However, in the United States and in a number of European countries, exchange organizations have taken the initiative of creating, or encouraging the creation of, specialized arbitration bodies.
An examination of these arbitration bodies is interesting in a number of respects. The solutions which they have adopted sometimes overturn our traditional conception of arbitration. What we frequently see are structures that are entirely or partially integrated into the exchange organization, which, like the exchanges themselves, operate within clearly defined rules. [Page22:]
This examination does not claim to be exhaustive. It aims rather to highlight the common features that caracterize arbitration relating to financial markets, using a few pertinent examples. To this end, we shall consider the distinctive features of the arbitration bodies (I) and the originality of the procedures employed (II).
I. The distinctive features of arbitration bodies in financial markets
Financial markets are for the most part regulated markets. The role of exchange organizations is to lay down the rules that govern the markets and then to oversee their operation, under the control of the exchange authorities. This self-regulating duty has profoundly influenced the arbitration bodies charged with settling securities disputes.
The most acknowledged effect of this situation concerns the close links between the exchange organization and the arbitration body. The degree of integration varies, depending on whether all the duties are in fact exercised by the same entity, in which case there is no distinction, or whether the arbitration body is located in an entity that is directly dependent upon the exchange organization. Nevertheless, under certain conditions, such structures have managed to acquire the independence necessary for them to achieve credibility (A).
Other effects are evident in the specific forms that arbitration may adopt. In some cases, arbitration is directly organized by the exchange authority, whilst in others, the arbitrators act as a tribunal of second instance in relation to disciplinary matters. Thus, even if it is placed in a structure that is independent of the exchange organization, the arbitration body is clearly influenced by market regulations (B).
A) Structures integrated into the exchange organization
As far as arbitration is concerned, the key word is 'independence', be it that of the arbitrator or of the authority that has appointed him or her. The existence of arbitration bodies that are fully part of or dependent upon an exchange organization is thus a quite original concept. This situation calls for special solutions in order to guarantee the impartiality of the arbitral proceedings.
In the United States, the effects of integrating arbitration bodies into exchange organizations appear to be counterbalanced by the vigilance of the authorities responsible for protecting investors' interests (1).
In other cases, the answer has been to provide for two-tiered arbitral proceedings (2).
The two largest stock exchange organizations in the United States, the New York Stock Exchange ('NYSE') and the National Association of Stock Dealers [Page23:] ('NASD'), each control their own structure for settling controversies. These integrated arbitration bodies alone deal with the resolution of almost all stock market disputes, as they respectively handle 8% and 90% of the arbitration cases conducted in this sphere.1
The NYSE arbitral body is an integral part of the exchange organization, which itself arranges the procedures. The president of the board of directors of the NYSE appoints a so-called Board of Arbitration, whose role is to lay down the rules and to monitor application of the procedures, and a Director of Arbitration, who is responsible for appointing the arbitrators.2
The NASD, on the other hand, has drawn a clearer line between its arbitration proceedings and its stock market operations. Arbitration was initially organized by a subsidiary, NASD Regulation, Inc., which was set up to oversee the proper functioning of the market. During the year 2000 it was entrusted to a new subsidiary, NASD Dispute Resolution Inc. ('NASDADR'),3 whose sole function is to settle disputes.
Despite the fact that the arbitration function resides in a different legal entity, it nevertheless remains closely linked to the NASD itself. Notably, the person in charge of appointing arbitrators, the Director of Arbitration, is appointed by the board of directors of the parent company.4
The question of the independence of arbitration bodies does not appear to cause any particular problems in the United States, however, as witnessed by the evident success of this method of dispute resolution, which is used for the majority of securities disputes.
The exchange organizations are referred to as Self-Regulatory Organizations: they lay down their own operating rules and themselves oversee the application of these rules. They are under the direct supervision of the exchange authorities - here the Securities and Exchange Commission ('SEC') - which, in particular, check that arbitration proceedings are fair and afford adequate protection of investors' rights.5
It would appear that the confidence placed in arbitration conducted under the auspices of exchange organizations is inspired by the rules of procedure. These rules are drawn up on the basis of a code of standard rules created in 1977 and regularly updated since then by the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, which includes bodies representing professionals and litigants.6 The SEC is directly involved in preparing these procedures and may require rules to be adopted which are aimed at protecting investors.
In a famous 1987 judgment,7 which marks the starting point of the growth of arbitration in the securities field, the United States Supreme Court judged that arbitration in this respect offered adequate guarantees to investors.
Although the integration of arbitration bodies into exchange organizations has been satisfactorily achieved in the United States, it would not appear to be a model easily transposable to Europe. In this respect, the example of integrated arbitration available to us - the Amsterdam stock exchange - is something of an exception. [Page24:]
The Amsterdam stock exchange has an internal arbitral body whose purpose is to settle disputes that may arise between the exchange and its members. It does not, however, deal with disputes with investors.8
The exchange organization itself appoints the members of the Arbitration Committee, which comprises at least ten persons, after consultation with the Dutch Securities Board. Its appointees do not include the president and vice-president, who are appointed by the president of the Amsterdam court, at the recommendation of the exchange organization.9 Disputes are brought before an arbitral tribunal made up of the president of the Arbitration Committee and between three and five members appointed by him.10
The independence of this arbitration body, which, despite being integrated into the exchange organization, deals with disputes in which the organization is itself a party, appears to rely solely upon the procedure of appeal to a commission comprising financial market professionals and non-professionals, all appointed by the president of the Amsterdam court.11
As for disputes involving investors, they are dealt with by a different body, the Dutch Securities Institute ('DSI'),12 which has no direct links with the exchange organization.
In the event of a dispute between investors and members, the former may lodge claims with a complaints commission, which, at the parties' request, may rule as an arbitral body. The president and vice-president of the six to eight member commission are appointed by the president of the Amsterdam court, at DSI's recommendation. Apart from the president and vice-president, all the members of the commission are financial market professionals, appointed by DSI's board of directors.13 The commission's decisions are open to appeal before an appeals commission, if this is the parties' intention. The appeals commission, which is also organized by the DSI, has the final word.14
This independent and highly accessible arbitration body provides investors with a useful method of resolving disputes.
B) Independent structures
Unlike the arbitration bodies created in the United States, the structures set up in Europe are, generally speaking, independent of exchange organizations. They are more similar to traditional structures of arbitration as entrusted to independent entities chosen by the parties. However, a closer look shows that the solutions which have been implemented do not all offer the reassuring familiarity of the usual structures.
Europe has the most diverse set of systems. For example, arbitration organized directly by the authorities that supervise the markets exists alongside private arbitration centres based on a tried and tested model. This unusual situation is due to the fact that the function of dispute settlement is closely linked with that of market regulation (1). It also explains the existence of arbitration bodies whose role is to hear appeals in disciplinary proceedings. Thus, arbitrators may be required to deal with issues that have a bearing upon market supervision (2). [Page25:]
In Britain, the prevailing system is of an entirely traditional style, since the London Stock Exchange does not have its own integrated arbitration body. The parties to a dispute may decide to have their dispute heard by the courts or by an arbitration body of their choice. A specialized arbitration institution exists for this very purpose, the City Disputes Panel ('CDP'), but recourse to this body is in no way obligatory.
The CDP is an entity independent of the London Stock Exchange and was set up in 1994 in response to the call from the financial community for a dispute resolution mechanism.15
Parties need simply to submit a request for arbitration to the CDP. The latter then sets up an arbitral tribunal, which may consist of three or five arbitrators. This arbitration centre, which is not linked to any exchange organization, combines finance practitioners with arbitration practitioners, from which group the arbitrators are selected.16
In France, alongside private arbitration bodies, there exists what could be considered to be a uniquely French feature: an arbitration procedure administered by the exchange authorities. The distinctive feature about the financial futures market ('MATIF') arbitration procedure17 is that it is organized by an authority known as the Conseil des Marchés Financiers ('CMF'), which performs the public service duties associated with market supervision.
The CMF has drawn up arbitration rules and a list of arbitrators.18 It thus acts as an appointing authority, which helps to guarantee the independence of the appointed arbitrators. Arbitration in this case might look as if it is a corollary aspect of market supervision, but in actual fact it is an independent process, since the arbitrators in this instance do not address disciplinary issues.
Although the CMF arbitration procedure elicits interest by virtue of its originality, it is limited by the fact that only disputes relating to transactions on the MATIF are covered. Parties may refer other stock market disputes either to an independent arbitration body or to the courts.
In this context, the recent creation in Paris of an arbitration body specializing in financial instruments is worthy of mention. The Financial Dispute Resolution Centre, otherwise known as EuroArbitrage, proposes mediation, expert appraisal and arbitration procedures specially tailored to financial market disputes.
This arbitration centre, whose creation coincides with that of Euronext, is independent of any exchange organization, however. It brings together in a single independent organization groups representing the various professions within the financial world.
It is worth observing that in certain circumstances arbitration bodies hear appeals in disciplinary proceedings arranged by exchange organizations.
An example is the Swiss Securities Exchange ('SWX'). The exchange organization fulfils its supervisory role through a supervisory office and a disciplinary [Page26:] commission. The latter is authorized to order disciplinary penalties, namely warnings, fines, suspensions and removal.19 Appeals may be made to a special tribunal against decisions to suspend or remove a member.20
The disciplinary commission and the appeals tribunal comprise three members appointed by the governing body of the exchange organization.21 They are internal bodies and their powers are of a contractual nature. Suspension and removal correspond to the plea of failure to perform or termination of the contract concluded by the exchange organization with its member. The financial penalties are laid down in the rules, which the member has undertaken to respect.
These internal bodies are not true arbitration bodies. Only the exchange organization is bound by their decisions. The decisions are binding on a member only if the latter accepts them. However, the member may appeal to an arbitral tribunal to challenge the penalties imposed by the disciplinary commission or the appeals tribunal, and the decisions of such arbitral tribunal are final.22 The arbitral tribunal in this case is made up of two arbitrators appointed by the parties and a third arbitrator as chair, who is appointed by the former two arbitrators.23
Such 'disciplinary' arbitration, which can also be found in certain other countries such as Italy,24 is peculiar to financial markets. The disciplinary role played by the arbitral tribunal lies on the periphery of arbitration.
II. The originality of the procedures
Stock market disputes have their own unique characteristics, which justify the use of specially adapted procedures. Financial market activities have become so sophisticated that a generalist judge or arbitrator cannot always comprehend the mechanisms involved. Most procedures are therefore designed to involve market professionals in the settlement of disputes.
Moreover, financial professionals have little tolerance for contentious situations, that harm their business activity, especially when the disputes drag on. For this reason, most arbitration bodies prefer amicable solutions, such as mediation, and seek to reduce the length of arbitration proceedings.25
The original nature of the procedures is thus reflected both in the way that the arbitral tribunals are constituted (A) and in the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (B).
A) Constitution of the arbitral tribunal
A simple way of setting up an arbitral tribunal is to have the arbitrators appointed by the parties. This is the most traditional method, because it is consistent with the consensual nature of arbitration.
However, this method of appointment does not appear to be favoured by the bodies specializing in securities disputes. The tendency of these bodies to intervene in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal is founded on a number of reasons - the rigorous selection of arbitrators, impartiality, a balance between [Page27:] financial and legal skills, and the desire to frustrate delaying tactics. It is all the easier to impose as the role arbitrators play in regulated markets is not that far removed from market supervision.
Hence, the intervention of arbitration bodies is seen first in the rigorous selection of individuals qualified to act as arbitrators (1) and thereafter in the appointment of the arbitrators called upon to form an arbitral tribunal (2).
a) Compilation of lists of arbitrators
The financial market arbitration bodies generally take responsibility for checking the skills and impartiality of arbitrators. Prior selection of arbitrators would appear to be a necessity peculiar to arbitration relating to financial instruments.
Thus, for disputes relating to financial markets, the rules of the American Arbitration Association ('AAA') include lists of arbitrators who specialize in the settlement of disputes of this kind. However, the parties are under no obligation to use the lists and may appoint an arbitrator who does not appear on them.26
In contrast to this, the specialized arbitration bodies have opted to make it obligatory for arbitrators to be chosen from their lists. The NYSE maintains lists of arbitrators in over thirty towns, based on a sophisticated selection process. Anybody wishing to appear on the list must complete a detailed questionnaire, which shows whether the candidate has the necessary profile. No arbitrator may be appointed who does not appear on the list.27
The NASD lists, which include over 7,000 names, are also mandatory. In order to become an NASD arbitrator, candidates must take an examination which is intended to check their knowledge of the procedure and of an arbitrator's duties.28
In Europe, financial exchange arbitration bodies likewise carry out a prior selection of arbitrators and make their selection mandatory. In France, the EuroArbitrage rules require that arbitrators be chosen from the lists drawn up by the centre, unless the permanent committee, which acts as appointing authority within the centre, grants an exception to this.29
The CMF arbitration rules applicable to disputes relating to the MATIF require parties to agree on the appointment of an arbitrator from the list it produces. Failing this, the arbitrator is appointed by the CMF.30
The CDP in London also makes a selection of arbitrators available for appointment. They constitute the 'panel' from which the CDP takes its name. Only panellists may be appointed to an arbitral tribunal.31
b) The division of skills within the arbitral tribunal
In order to cope with the increasing complexity of securities disputes, the various specialized tribunals make the inclusion of members of the financial community in arbitral tribunals compulsory.
However, their inclusion raises the delicate question of their impartiality. Skilled financial market practitioners are not always entirely neutral with respect to parties who are in the same line of business. [Page28:]
To resolve this question, the arbitration bodies in the United States decided to allow members of the financial community to be included only if they represent a minority. The power of decision remains with arbitrators from outside the financial world.
The NYSE and the NASDADR thus produce two separate lists, one comprising public arbitrators, and the other industry arbitrators.32 Arbitral tribunals thus necessarily comprise two public arbitrators and one industry arbitrator.33
The specific provisions relating to financial instruments within the AAA rules also provide for the production of two separate lists. Where the arbitral tribunal comprises three members, one of them must be a financial practitioner, whereas the other two must not come from the financial community.34
This solution does not appear to have won unanimous support in Europe, where some arbitration bodies place greater emphasis on the involvement of financial professionals.
The CDP in London has so opted, with arbitral tribunals comprising two financial specialists and one legal specialist. The latter, however, chairs the tribunal and thus has the casting decision.35
Involvement of financial practitioners is also laid down as a principle in the EuroArbitrage rules, but the appointing authority is left to decide in what proportion.
Thus, whilst most of the specialist arbitration bodies agree on the need to involve financial professionals, there are differences in the way they resolve the issue of the influence such professionals have on arbitral decisions.
a) Procedures for appointment by the authorities
Provision may be made for the arbitral tribunal to be appointed by an appointing authority independent of the parties. On the basis of the details provided by the parties, this authority is required to ensure that the composition of the arbitral tribunal is optimally suited to the nature of the dispute and what is at stake.
The appointing authority must also ensure that an impartial arbitral tribunal is constituted, on the basis of the statements of independence provided by the arbitrators.
This method is the one adopted by the NYSE arbitration rules. As soon as proceedings are instituted, the Director of Arbitration appoints an arbitral tribunal, made up of at least three arbitrators selected according to their specialities and in light of the nature of the dispute.36
Other arbitration bodies are less interventionist. The EuroArbitrage arbitration rules, for instance, state that the permanent committee shall determine the number of arbitrators and itself appoint them, unless the parties have explicitly provided in the arbitration agreement that the arbitral tribunal shall comprise three arbitrators appointed by the parties, in which case the parties appoint the arbitrators themselves.37 The other notable feature of the EuroArbitrage rules is that it provides for the establishment of a permanent arbitral tribunal, to which parties may refer cases at any time.38[Page29:]
In any event, appointment of arbitrators by an arbitration body does not deprive the parties of their right to control the appointment after the fact. They still have the possibility of challenging on reasonable grounds the arbitrators thus appointed. In all cases, the control of the parties is confined to ensuring that the arbitrators are impartial. The arbitration body remains sole judge of the skills and experience of the arbitrators.
b) Procedures for consensual appointment
The free choice of arbitrators by the parties offers real benefits in some cases. In particular, this method of appointment is the only option where no specialized arbitration centre with appointing authority exists. The parties appoint the arbitrators themselves, and in the event of disagreement, they refer to a third party, which may be a judicial or administrative authority.
This is the system adopted by many sets of arbitration rules relating to financial markets in Europe. The Swiss and Italian examples discussed above are cases in point.39
However, the most noteworthy system is undoubtedly that of the NASDADR, which has devised a unique compromise solution that respects the freedom of choice of the parties whilst maintaining it within certain bounds.
Software known as the 'Neutral List Selection System'40 is used to select arbitrators on the basis of their skills. It also deals with conflicts of interest. It compiles from the general NASDADR list a special list of individuals who meet the criteria necessary for resolution of the dispute in question and are available for immediate appointment.
The list of arbitrators compiled by the software is sent to the parties, who rank the arbitrators by order of preference. The Director of Arbitration then appoints the arbitrators on the basis of these rankings.41
It is then up to the parties to agree on the identity of the person to chair the arbitral tribunal. If they fail to agree within fifteen days, the Director of Arbitration appoints the chair from the list of public arbitrators.
In conclusion, the system of freedom of choice by the parties would appear to be called for only when there is no adequate structure for handling the complex tasks of selection and appointment of arbitrators. However, arbitration bodies tend to intervene in the appointment process whenever they have the necessary means.
B) Use of alternative means of dispute resolution
The financial markets, and transactions involving financial instruments in general constitute fertile ground for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. One of the features of the financial industry is the fact that a very large number of transactions are carried out by a small number of operators, which means that a dispute may arise between parties who work together on a regular basis.
They therefore need to solve their dispute by means which will not heighten tension and which will enable them to continue to do business together. In this context, amicable settlement procedures often take precedence over arbitration (1). A further point worth noting is the possibility for the parties to put any dispute quickly to rest through accelerated procedures (2). [Page30:]
Mediation is the most widespread means of alternative dispute resolution. A third party is asked to propose a solution that may be agreeable to the parties. Such a solution has no legal force and, when embarking on mediation, the parties do not forego their right to turn to arbitration subsequently.
Mediation is particularly recommended for the resolution of differences between private investors and investment service providers, due to the simplicity and speed of the procedure.
Mediation is a phenomenon of significant proportions in the United States. In 1995, the NASDADR introduced a mediation process, which has so far allowed close to 3,500 disputes to be resolved.42 The NASDADR currently holds a list of 800 mediators and is planning to set up an Internet mediation system in January 2002.
Use of conciliation procedures inspired by the Swedish Ombudsman system has been developed in some European countries.43 This usually consists of an independent person to whom complaints are submitted and whose task it is to examine such complaints and find an amicable solution. The mechanism is especially suited to disputes involving investors.
In France, the stock exchange commission, COB (Commission des opérations de bourse), has adopted a mediation charter, under which it appoints a mediator charged with seeking an amicable solution to disputes between an investor and an issuer or investment service provider. The mediator proposes a negotiated solution, which is not binding on the parties. The mediator's proposal is confidential and the parties undertake not to disclose it at a later date.44
In Belgium, private investors may call upon the so-called 'Ombudsman for bank and stock exchange company customers'.45 Similar systems exist in Greece, England, Ireland, Italy, Germany and Switzerland.
The Ombudsman sometimes has real decision-making powers. Hence the solutions the Ombudsman proposes are sometimes binding on investment service providers, but not on private investors.
The success enjoyed by these various means of settling controversies is evidence of the interest aroused by amicable dispute resolution methods. There is similar interest from the financial community in accelerated arbitration procedures.
Generally speaking, professionals favour a swift settlement of disputes that may arise in a financial market.
In order to achieve this, arbitration bodies lay down relatively short procedural deadlines to allow a case to be dealt with as efficiently as possible. In addition, many financial market arbitration bodies provide for accelerated procedures.46
The accelerated procedures set up by the NYSE, NASDADR, CDP and EuroArbitrage are all based on similar principles. The controversy is dealt with by a sole arbitrator, who normally decides on the basis of documentary evidence, or holds just one hearing. The arbitration must be completed within a very short period.47[Page31:]
In order to ensure that accelerated procedures lead to satisfactory solutions, the sole arbitrator must demonstrate unfailing availability and professionalism. Not all matters lend themselves to such a procedure. However, regardless of whether they are accelerated or not, the arbitration procedures set up by specialized stock market dispute bodies usually allow disputes to be settled more rapidly. The intervention of arbitration bodies in the selection and appointment of arbitrators is undeniably a contributory factor.
By way of illustration, the NASDADR statistics show that, on average, disputes are settled within around 10 months.48 Bearing in mind that in the United States traditional court proceedings can take some ten years, it is easy to see why arbitration enthuses the financial exchange professions.
In conclusion, armed with original solutions, arbitration may be considered as a means of dispute resolution that is particularly suited to the needs of financial markets. The internationalization of the European markets and the existence of specialized structures should encourage the use of this method of settling disputes in a securities context.
1 United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Oversight of Self-Regulatory Organization Arbitration (1999).
2 NYSE, Rules 633 and 635.
3 Federal Register, vol. 64, no. 116 (Thursday 17 June 1999), Notices.
4 NASDADR's Director of Arbitration is appointed by NASD's Board of Governors (NASD, Rule 10103).
5 Edward Chukwuemeke Okeke, 'Arbitration of Federal Securities Claims' (1999) 15:3 Arbitration International 271; Constantine N. Katsoris, 'Symposium on Arbitration in the Securities Industry' [1994] Fordham Law Review 1502.
6 Marcus Boeglin, 'The Use of Arbitration Clauses in the Field of Banking and Finance: Current Status and Preliminary Conclusion' (1998) 15:3 J. Int'l Arb. 22; Hans van Houtte, 'Arbitration Involving Securities Transactions' (1996) 12:4 Arbitration International 405.
7 Shearson v. MacMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). Edward Chukwuemeke Okeke, op.cit. supra note 5 at 278; Robert S. Clemente, 'Trends in the Securities Industry Arbitration. A View of the Past, the Present and the Future: 'The Dream, the Nightmare and the Reality' (September-October 1996) New York State Bar Journal.
8 General Rules of Amsterdam Exchange NV, s. 12.2.
9 Rules for AEX Arbitration Proceedings, art. 3.
10 Ibid., art. 5.
11 Ibid., art. 11.
12 DSI Brochure.
13 DSI, Klachtenreglement, art. 3.
14 DSI, Reglement van Beroep, art. 2.
15 Norbert Horn, 'The Development of Arbitration in International Financial Transactions' (2000) 16:3 Arbitration International 279 at 289.
16 CDP, Arbitration Rules, April 1997.
17 Decision of 22 December 1999 on the CMF rules of arbitration relating to transactions on the financial futures market.
18 CMF rules of arbitration, appendix 1.
19 SWX Swiss Exchange, Règlement d'organisation, art. 4 and 6; SWX Swiss Exchange, Règlement de procédure de la Commission disciplinaire, art. 6, 7 and 9.
20 SWX Swiss Exchange, Règlement d'organisation, art. 7; SWX Swiss Exchange, Règlement de l'Instance de recours, art. 1.
21 SWX Swiss Exchange, Règlement de procédure de la Commission disciplinaire, art. 1; SWX Swiss Exchange, Règlement de l'Instance de recours, art. 1.
22 SWX Swiss Exchange, Règlement de procédure de la Commission disciplinaire, art. 9; SWX Swiss Exchange, Règlement de l'Instance de recours, art. 6.9.
23 SWX Swiss Exchange, Statuts de la Bourse suisse de valeurs mobilières, art. 23.
24 Rules of the Markets organized and managed by the Italian Exchange, art. 3.4.5, 7.3 and 7.5.
25 Philippe Marini, 'Arbitrage, médiation et marchés financiers' [2000] Revue de jurisprudence commerciale 155 at 156.
26 AAA, Supplementary Procedures for Securities Arbitration, art. 3(b).
27 NYSE, Rule 634.
28 NASD, Rule 10308.
29 Règlement d'arbitrage d'Euroarbitrage, art. 7.
30 See supra note 18.
31 See supra note 16.
32 NYSE, Rule 634; NASD, Rule 10308.
33 NYSE, Rule 607; NASD, Rule 10308.
34 See supra note 26.
35 See supra note 16.
36 NYSE, Rule 607(b).
37 See supra note 29.
38 Ibid., art. 6.
39 Supra I(B)(2).
40 NASD, Rule 10308.
41 Ibid.
42 Mahlon Frankhauser, 'Arbitration: The Alternative to Securities and Employment Litigation' (1995) The Business Lawyer 1378.
43 See M. Boeglin, op. cit. supra note 6 at 26.
44 Charte de la médiation, Bull. COB no. 316 (Sept. 1997) 15.
45 On 4 May 2000, the Belgian Association of Banks (ABB), BXS and the Belgian Association of Stock Market Members (ABMB) entered into an agreement extending the Ombudsman's powers to stock market companies. Hence the name by which the Ombudsman is now designated.
46 NYSE, Rule 601; NASD, Rule 10302; CDP, Arbitration Rules, April 1997; Règlement d'arbitrage d'Euroarbitrage, s. IV.
47 Ibid.
48 NASD, Dispute Resolution Statistics (June 2000).